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Item Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility(Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 2007-06-01) Angeloni, Laura; Martins-da-Rocha, Victor FilipeWe consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.Item Existence of an equilibrium for infinite horizon economies with and without complete information(Elsevier Science Sa, 2012-08) Raad, Rodrigo JardimThis work proves the existence of an equilibrium for an infinite horizon economy where trade takes place sequentially over time. There exist two types of agents: the first correctly anticipates all future contingent endogenous variables with complete information as in Radner [Radner, R. (1972). Existence of equilibrium of plans, prices and price expectations in a sequence of markets. Econometrica, 289-303] and the second has exogenous expectations about the future environment as in Grandmont [Grandmont, J. M. (1977). Temporary general equilibrium theory. Econometrica, 535-572] and information based on the current and past aggregate variables including those which are private knowledge. Agents with exogenous expectations may have inconsistent optimal plans but have predictive beliefs in the context of Blackwell and Dubbins [Blackwell, D., Dubins, L (1962). Merging of opinions with increasing information. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 882-886] with probability transition rules based on all observed variables. We provide examples of this framework applied to models of differential information and environments exhibiting results of market selection and convergence of an equilibrium. The existence result can be used to conclude that, by adding the continuity assumption on the probability transition rules, we obtain the existence of an equilibrium for some models of differential information and incomplete markets. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Item Large economies with differential information and without free disposal(Springer, 2009-02) Angeloni, Laura; Rocha, Vitor Filipe Martins daWe consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321-332, 2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 21, 495-526, 2002). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321-332, 2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then, motivated by the issue of contracts' execution, we adapt the incentive compatibility property introduced in Krasa and Yannelis (Econometrica 62, 881-900, 1994) and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.Item Large economies with differential information but without free disposal(Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em Economia, 2008-02-28) Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe; Angeloni, LauraWe consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without freedisposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.