Uma discussão acerca das regras eleitorais do sistema político brasileiro e dos incentivos aos comportamento parlamentar
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2009-03-05
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Biderman, Ciro
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The present work aims to evaluate the impacts originated in the electoral rules of Brazilian political system on the congressmen behavior. The main focus relies on their decision on the federal budget amendments. The traditional literature assumes their choices are linked with the formation of the informal electoral district. Incentives that drive congressmen to individually behave during electoral periods would keep the same direction during their mandates. This set of incentives creates a completely non-organized Congress, where parties have no influence. With an extreme opposed interpretation, some authors do not accept the traditional vision, showing up more coordinated and organized motivation for congressmen actions. Parties have an important role in this new set of incentives. However, this newer literature did not investigate the incentives for the budget amendments choice, a blank that this research intended to fill up. The results found confirm the newer interpretation about the Brazilian political system. In the first chapter, new indexes that measure electoral concentration are indicated. Their results suggest that votes are more dispersed than accepted by the traditional literature. In the second chapter, the political dominance is considered. The investigation shows that such concept can not be accepted as the rule for the system as a whole. In its place, models that consider the interdependence between mayors and congressmen election seem more appropriated to represent the entire political system. In the last chapter, the research directly focuses on the incentives on the budget amendments. Its results suggest that congressmen decisions are influenced not only by their individual results in the election, but they consider city mayors' party as well. Moreover, data indicate the existence of a timing cycle of different incentives depending on the mandate moment. The evidences brought by this work show advances in the new literature about the Brazilian political system and demand more research that wider the comprehension about so relevant theme.