

Pax Brasiliana? A Study of Brazil's Role in Constitutional and Political Crises in Latin America (1990-2015)

Pax Brasiliana? Um Estudo da Atuação Brasileira em Crises Constitucionais e Políticas na América Latina (1990-2015)

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Luigi R. Einaudi

Interview, 2018

Luigi R. Einaudi was US ambassador to the OAS (1989-1993), US special envoy to the Peru-Ecuador peace talks (1995-1998) and secretary general of the OAS (2004-2005).

Luigi R. Einaudi foi o embaixador dos EUA na OEA (1989-1993), enviado especial dos EUA nas negociações de paz entre Peru e Equador (1995-1998) e secretário geral da OAS (2004-2005).

Luigi R. Einaudi fue el embajador de EEUU en la OEA (1989-1993), enviado especial de EEUU en las negociaciones de paz entre Perú y Ecuador (1995-1998) y secretario general de OAS (2004-2005).

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Luigi R. Einaudi

Luigi Roberto Einaudi was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1936. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Harvard (1957), was drafted into the United States Army, serving from 1957 to 1959, and later returned to Harvard for a Ph.D. (1966). He worked at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, where he led the institution's social science research on Latin America from 1963 to 1974.

He then joined the State Department, having served twice on the secretary of State's policy planning staff (1974-1977 and 1993-1997). Einaudi was also director of policy planning for the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (1977-1989) and US ambassador to the Organization of American States (1989-1993).

From 1995 to 1998, Luigi Einaudi was the US Special Envoy in the peace talks that led to a comprehensive settlement of the long-lasting territorial and boundary conflict between Ecuador and Peru. He was widely considered a key mediator in the negotiation process.

In June, 2000, Dr. Einaudi was elected to a five-year term as assistant secretary general of the OAS. He proceeded to serve as acting secretary general upon the resignation of Secretary General Miguel Angel Rodríguez, from October 2004, to May 2005. During his time at the OAS, Einaudi was strongly involved in attempts to find solutions to the crisis in Haiti.

He moved on to be a distinguished visiting fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. and a member of the Comitato Scientifico of the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, in Turin, Italy.

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Interview: April 12, 2018

O.S. – Ambassador Einaudi, thank you so much for taking the time for this interview. I think that, in Brazil we sometimes tend to overestimate Brazil's influence was in certain historical events in Latin America. That's why, last year, we decided to focus on moments of diplomatic, constitutional and political crisis, because crises – the way we understand it – sometimes are moments when particular dynamics and power relations, become obvious. So it allows us to tell History based on the personal impressions and memories of those who engaged in it. Since then, we have selected a series of policymakers who could tell us their stories, which allows us to add important perspectives. Now, in your case, you have written a lot, you have given many talks, and I have listened to or read all of them, so I will ask questions that are based on what you have said, so you don't have to repeat yourself.

L.E. – You know, my State Department Oral History interview is still not finished because the person they sent to interview me, who was its founder and a very interesting gentleman, had never been to Latin America. So he was unable to ask me many relevant questions.

O.S. – That's fascinating. I think that says a lot, right? It reminds me of an oral history interview we conducted with [Brazilian diplomat and former secretary general of the Organization of American States] Baena Soares¹, and he said: "You know... this guy [Einaudi] understood us."

L.E. – Yes. The quote that is most interesting from this exact point point of view is that, many years after we were both out of the Government, I had an occasion to sit down and talk a little about the past with Bernard Aronson² – who was the assistant secretary of State under James Baker.³ Aronson was a Democrat who was named to help us to get out of the Central America mess, and with whom I worked very closely on many things. He didn't like me very much, I think in part because people in Latin America liked me – he once said to me when he returned from a trip to the region, "I bring you greetings from 'boom boom' and 'boom' but I will never do that again."

O.S. – [Laughter].

L.E. – In any case, in another conversation, long after we were both out of government, he said: "You know, when I was talking to you, I never knew whether I was talking to one of us or one of them" [laughter].

O.S. – That is very interesting. This reminds me of a story that, back in the day, the Brazilian government feared that the Brazilian diplomats who went to France enjoyed Paris so much that they started to represent the interests of Paris rather than Brazil, so the Foreign Ministry supposedly shortened the period of time they spent in Paris. But in the case of the United States, I think, there is such a lack of people who understand Latin America, and these comments, seem to underestimate the strategic value of having somebody who is seen as an interlocutor.

¹ João Clemente Baena Soares was a Brazilian diplomat who served as secretary general to the OAS from 1984 to 1994. In 2014, professors Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho conducted an oral history interview with Ambassador Baena Soares, which can be accessed through this link: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/historia-oral/entrevista-tematica/joao-clemente-baena-soares-ii>

² Bernard Aronson was the United States assistant secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1989 to 1993.

³ James Baker served as US secretary of State from 1989 to 1992 under President George H. W. Bush. He was also White House chief of staff from 1981 to 1985 and from 1992 to 1993.

L.E. – That’s right.

O.S. – But it also says a lot about priorities: perhaps mainstream Washington doesn’t necessarily regard Latin America or somebody who understands Latin America as something that is so crucial to the overall foreign policy.

L.E. – But they understood that I did [understand Latin America] and therefore I had a lot of unofficial power for a very long time, because people understood that I understood. And most of the time the smart ones understood that they didn’t understand. *That* enabled me to survive in spite of the fact that I was never a career diplomat, that I didn’t come from the Foreign Service. I always had to survive the politics – that was very difficult during those years.

O.S. – Right. Ambassador, I would like to ask you about three episodes: the first is your time as ambassador to the OAS from 1989 to 1993; then, your role in the Peru-Ecuador peace talks in 1995 – you have given a tremendous amount of highly valuable information: I used, for example, your talk at Cornell in 2015⁴ in my class. And the third episode is your time as assistant secretary and secretary general of the OAS from 2000 to 2005, and I’d like to talk about particular perceptions concerning how do you think dynamics have changed over those three periods. So, my first question is: how do you remember the time when you come to the OAS, in 1989? Which dynamics shaped the Americas at that moment?

L.E. – Something very unusual happened in the United States with the election of the first Bush,⁵ who knew something about international affairs and was handed a situation in Central America out of the [Ronald] Reagan⁶ administration that was simply unsustainable. So, what Bush did was to ask James Baker to fix it and he gave Baker a very broad freehand within I think only very general guidelines... I have a lot of regard for the first Bush. And Baker chose Aronson because he knew that he needed bipartisan support. The situation in Congress was simply out of control. He needed an active democrat with labor ties to be his assistant secretary for Latin America. And it was a very unusual situation in that Baker was absolutely Bush’s man, so there was never any doubt that Baker spoke for Bush. And that put the State Department in a strong position, but that didn’t guarantee anything. What happened next was that for the first time in recent times, the US built a first-class team for Latin America: we had Aronson, we had Carla Hills⁷ as USTR [US trade representative]. And Carla Hills was somebody who I got to know and have a lot of respect for and her chief assistant for Latin America was a friend of mine – a Foreign Service officer, Myles Frechette,⁸ who later was ambassador to Colombia among other things. So we had the USTR, we had State and we had in the Central American crisis something that assured attention and priority and even ambition. One of the interesting things looking at the people who worked on Central America, they tended to be the most ambitious and hungry people and none of them are now working on Central America –

⁴ “The End of Conventional War in Latin America: The Peru-Ecuador War and Its Impact” – available at <http://www.cornell.edu/video/ambassador-luigi-einaudi-peru-ecuador-war-impact>.

⁵ George Herbert Walker Bush was the 41st president of the United States, from 1989 to 1993.

⁶ Ronald Wilson Reagan was governor of California from 1967 to 1975 and president of the United States from 1981 to 1989.

⁷ Carla Anderson Hills is an American lawyer and public official. She served as United States secretary of Housing and Urban Development from 1975 to 1977, under the Gerald Ford administration, and as US trade representative from 1989 to 1993, under the George H. W. Bush administration.

⁸ Myles Frechette was an American career diplomat, who, by request of Carla Hills, served as assistant US trade representative, for Latin America the Caribbean and Africa from 1989 to 1993. He was also ambassador to Colombia from 1994 to 1997.

none of them are now working on Latin America, for that matter. But in those days the difficulties of the time, the complexities, the challenges the United States was facing... There was attention and resources, there was a chain of command from the White House straight down, and it was organized. Unlike the Reagan period, when, in effect, my friend George Shultz,⁹ as secretary of State, had to spend his time putting out fires and trying to control crazy people – like Oliver North¹⁰ and Constantine Menges¹¹ and others – Bush and Baker developed a team that had attention, priority, high-level people and rapidly a solid working approach based on the need to resolve the Central American situation politically rather than militarily. And there, interestingly, Brazil played two important roles, together with Mexico: the first role is the known one: support for non-intervention with a twist of “non-US” activity. When Baena Soares was the secretary general of the OAS, he was in a sense, a guarantee for everybody: with a Brazilian secretary general, a man of the professionalism and independence of Baena Soares, the OAS is not going to be abused as easily as it was in the past. A small footnote on Baena Soares: I strongly believe in the importance of teamwork and that organizations need good leaders – I was happy to play a leadership role in opening US policy to views from Latin America, but I am even happier to give credit to Baena for playing a leadership role in response. Baena came to the OAS with a team. It is very interesting to notice that when I became the US ambassador there, many of the other ambassadors – the Chilean, the Mexican, others as well – had been ambassadors to Brazil in Brasília when Baena Soares had been secretary general of Itamaraty.

O.S. – I had not been aware of that. That’s interesting.

L.E. – So he had a group of people who understood him, who knew they could work with him, who knew they could trust him. So Baena is the first Brazilian dimension linked to non-intervention. The second Brazilian dimension is that Brazil had been working with – and earning the dislike of the Americans over – the Rio Group.¹² And the Rio Group was seen in the American bureaucracy as sort of the opposition.

O.S. – Because it excluded the United States.

L.E. – Seen as the opposition really of the worst kind, because you couldn’t claim they were communists, so they were harder to discredit. I had become known within the State Department as the defender of the Rio Group and had several times arranged meetings and other occasions that enabled the Rio Group – ministers, ambassadors – to present their case, etc. One of my roles not terribly well-known outside – although inside it was quite well known – is that I had survived all of these political changes and problems because I had really been, first, the member of the policy planning staff, the central staff, of the State Department under [Henry] Kissinger.¹³ Then [I] had become the planning director for the Latin American Bureau. The State Department rotates its people every two or three years

⁹ George Shultz is an American economist and businessman, who served as secretary of State from 1982 to 1989.

¹⁰ Oliver Laurence North is a retired US Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel, military historian and political commentator. He was convicted in the Iran-Contra Affair in the late 1980’s, but all charges against him were dismissed in 1991.

¹¹ Constantine Menges worked for the CIA as national intelligence officer for Latin America from 1981 to 1983 and as special assistant for President Ronald Reagan from 1983 to 1986. During this time, he took part in the planning of the US military intervention in Grenada, known as Operation Urgent Fury.

¹² The Rio Group (G-Rio) is a permanent association of Latin American countries for political consultation. It was formed in 1986.

¹³ Henry Alfred Kissinger is an American statesman and political scientist. He served as US secretary of State from 1973 to 1977 and National Security advisor from 1969 to 1975, concurrently.

and policy planning is not appreciated at the lower levels, and because it requires an enormous amount of work nobody wants it. So I actually survived as the director of the policy planning staff of the Bureau for many years and developed a role as bureaucratic coordinator and institutional memory.

O.S. – Would you say that this is still the case today?

L.E. – No. They returned to a rotational system after I left. Look, there are some extraordinarily able people in the Foreign Service and, since we're speaking of the Brazilian context, I would say that one of the best ones is Thomas Shannon.¹⁴

O.S. – That's right, he will be missed in Brazil.

L.E. – Oh, my heavens! Well, he was very badly treated at the end of his period in Brazil.

O.S. – That's right, but he will still be missed, I think.

L.E. – Also a good person – but this is an example of what happens – take an officer who had agreed to become my Deputy in the policy planning operation: Donna Hrinak.¹⁵

O.S. – Yes.

L.E. – She was a competent and gifted person, that's why I wanted her – but being my deputy, particularly after I left, didn't seem very good and she avoided that, because the career people avoid those kinds of position. It's too much work and they don't go anywhere. In any case, I was very aware of Brazil and Brazil's views. The Rio Group had many people associated with it. The other country that was very important in this was, of course, Mexico and it's particularly important in terms of the OAS. Mexico had an ambassador for several years at the OAS, whose name I can't remember off the top of my head right now, but who was basically known as "Doctor No".

O.S. – [Laughter].

L.E. – His job was to say "no" to anything that the US said "yes" to. That was intended to keep a check on what was seen as US interventionism. And it generally worked well for that objective for its times. But now you had a Brazilian secretary general [Baena Soares] who knew how to get things done and a Mexican successor to "Doctor No" as ambassador – Icaza¹⁶. And Icaza, by the way, has written a very good memoir of his whole career that is called "*La Alegría de Servir*", and he understood cooperation was under the right terms. One of the reasons I was good at what I did is that I liked the people I was working with, I certainly liked the Americans, and I also liked the Brazilians, the Mexicans and the Latin Americans and Caribbeans generally. I was particularly close to Peru. I understood their culture, and worked with them. Quite a few of my colleagues in the Foreign Service don't particularly like Latin America and Latin Americans, that made it hard to enjoy their work or to develop trust, and the kinds of understandings that are part of life, if it is going to be successful.

O.S. – Right.

¹⁴ Thomas Alfred Shannon Jr. is an American diplomat, who served as under secretary of State for Political Affairs from 2016 to 2018. He was also assistant secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs from 2005 to 2009 and US ambassador to Brazil from 2010 to 2013.

¹⁵ Donna Jean Hrinak is an American businesswoman and diplomat. She was US ambassador to Venezuela from 2000 to 2002, and Brazil, from 2002 to 2004. She is now president of Boeing Latin America.

¹⁶ Eusebio Antonio de Icaza González is a Mexican diplomat. He was the Mexican ambassador to the OAS from 1986 to 1991.

L.E. – So in any case you have now, here, you have the Americans suddenly moving to a position, with the Bush Administration, where they clearly are going to try to resolve the Central American wars diplomatically. The Cold War was winding down. So in a sense, the fear is beginning to dissipate and what is also dissipating is a whole period of the military domination in the hemisphere. And that created an opportunity for commonality and here you have to take one's hat off to the Chileans, who, having got rid of Pinochet,¹⁷ were eager to demonstrate the importance of democracy and what they had achieved. And so that was part of the setting for Resolution 1080¹⁸ in Santiago. Now, let me make a couple of comments about all of this, though. In the first place, it took an enormous skill to put that through because the traditional position of most of Latin American countries, I think, including Brazil, was still the non-intervention posture. In fact it was a Brazilian diplomat who, at the key moment of the negotiations, came up with the formula that enabled 1080 to pass. It was Bernardo Pericás.

O.S. – We conducted an oral history interview with him, particularly about his role as Brazilian ambassador to Paraguay in 1999, and later on in Cuba.¹⁹ Whenever things go wrong in Brazilian foreign policy these days, we say that we no longer have the likes of Bernardo Pericás. He was a great diplomat.

L.E. – Well, it's true. An extraordinarily able man.

O.S. – That's right. He had a key role in Central America.

L.E. – Specific role, very specific on developing democratic solidarity that reduced fears of intervention. American policy, led by Aronson, wanted to have a declaration against coups d'État and against military intervention – and I mention this in my most recent talks without identifying Bernardo – but the key phrase “the sudden or irregular interruption of a democratic political process,” which got rid of the idea of coup, got rid of military opposition, got rid of everything and focused on what it was that we were trying to oppose, that was Pericás's language. He's the one that came up with that. But [in] the background, the real father of the success was, as I think I implied – I didn't say explicitly, but I'm telling you now – was Carlos Andrés Pérez.²⁰ And the reason was very simple: he was appalled – the way so many other people were – at the fact that the Inter-American System had been so weak and incompetent that it had been unable to deal with the [Manuel] Noriega²¹ phenomenon in Panama.

O.S. – Of course.

¹⁷ Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte was the leader of the military junta that overthrew the government of Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973. He then became the head of the military dictatorship which ruled Chile until 1990.

¹⁸ The OAS General Assembly Resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91) had the goal of promoting and protecting representative democracy in the Americas. It is considered as a predecessor of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which was approved in 2001. The full text is available at: <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres1080.htm>

¹⁹ Bernardo Pericás Neto served as Brazilian ambassador to the OAS from 1989 to 1992 and to Paraguay from 1998 to 2000. Professors Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho conducted an oral history interview with Pericás, which is available at: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/historia-oral/entrevista-tematica/bernardo-pericas-neto-1>.

²⁰ The president of Venezuela from 1974 to 1979 and from 1989 to 1993.

²¹ Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno was a Panamanian military and the *de facto* leader of the country from 1983 to 1989. Despite not being an official head of state, he was part of the military junta that exercised actual control over Panama and appointed the nominal president, who had little power.

L.E. – And so it was that Carlos Andres Perez decided we could reinvent the old Venezuelan idea of non-recognition in the case of a coup, and he got the South American presidents to sign on to it. And then, once the presidents had signed on to it, the Foreign Ministries couldn't very well oppose it. They could try to keep it from being too bad, but... [laughter].

O.S. – That's right.

L.E. – But here, you know, I have to tell you my American colleagues almost blew it, because they didn't want to accept that there would just be a meeting, they wanted to go straight for the jugular, break relations and all kinds of things. It didn't make any sense. It couldn't be done; they didn't understand the environment. But Aronson, who was, in fact, my boss – all ambassadors work for the assistant secretary, in practice – did not want to settle for a meeting and we had an argument. It was an extraordinary argument, most of which happened in a stuck elevator in Santiago.

O.S. – [Laughter].

L.E. – In that elevator I convinced our delegation head, Larry Eagleburger²² – who was was a clever and experienced career diplomat – that I was right and Aronson was wrong and I got his support to go through with that and we got the resolution 1080, accepting that it wasn't calling for automatic break of relations, but to support the draft we had worked out in the committee, which was to call for an automatic meeting of the Permanent Council. Now, let me say a couple of things there: again, Resolution 1080 instructs the secretary general to call the meeting. So, first of all, it doesn't say "instructs Baena Soares to act," but everybody accepted that language knowing that it was Baena Soares who was there, that Baena Soares was a cautious oldline diplomat, who wasn't going to do anything crazy, who wasn't going to jump just if the Americans told him to jump. So, again, it's another reason why Baena was so important. But it was also important procedurally, just as Bernardo Pericás' language on the sudden or irregular interruption of a democratic government avoided raising hackles on coups. The idea that it was an automatic convocation meant that you didn't have to wait the way they normally did in the Permanent Council for a government to ask for a meeting – no, this is going to be automatic. And that was a strong development and it put in the hands of the secretary general legal automaticity together with personal trust. That's what made that possible, and that's why I think that we were at the peak in the early, mid-1990's, in terms of the possibilities of regional solidarity and democracy. And the reason is very simple: it was new, and therefore we still had illusion on our side.

O.S. – [Laughter].

L.E. – And illusion in life is very important. Hope in life is very important. We also had the sense that maybe something could happen on the economic side. Remember that we were moving toward the acceptance – for the first time – of a summit process, the acceptance of ideas of free trade area. Now, you know, Brazil was not in the lead on that. The doctrine of [João Augusto de] Araújo Castro²³ was much too strong, the idea that the US was bent on trying to freeze world power in ways that would keep Brazil and others down. But, as I say, this was a period of illusion and of movement and Brazil was too smart to stand in the way

²² Lawrence Sidney Eagleburger was an American career diplomat and statesman. He served as US deputy secretary of State from 1989 to 1992 and as secretary of State for a brief period between 1992 and 1993.

²³ João Augusto de Araújo Castro was a Brazilian diplomat. He served as Brazilian ambassador to the United Nations from 1968 to 1971 and to the US from 1971 to 1975. He was also the minister of Foreign Affairs from 1963 to 1964, under the João Goulart administration.

of illusion and movement. And other countries were pushing: as I said, the Chileans, the Peruvians... Peruvians in the post-Fujimori²⁴ period became extremely eager to support democratic procedures and Peru has had some very good diplomats. Carlos Garcia Bedoya,²⁵ who, unfortunately, died too soon, had been Foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, who was a major figure and understood both the importance of a global perspective – like Brazil – but also the importance of democracy, even though he was Foreign minister during the military regime. But Peru's was a military regime that was not of the order of some of the others elsewhere.

O.S. – Yes.

L.E. – So all these things came together. There was something that the Bush people called the “Enterprise for the Americas Initiative,” which was an early version of what later became the proposal for a Free Trade Area [of the Americas].²⁶ And Carla Hills came as the representative of President Bush to the General Assembly in Paraguay, in 1990. So there was this political illusion, some sense of solidarity, some sense of relief from the past. A sense that things were moving, in the United States, in a positive direction. Unfortunately, the Americans kept blasting away at the need for democracy – but without putting anything behind it. As I said in my lecture, and I have to underscore the importance of this: you can't support democracy if you are just doing it rhetorically. You have to be willing to put some resources into it, to have some training, to establish a school, to enable electoral authorities to get together and so forth. And all of that takes money, and it takes time and it takes patience and it takes building cadres. The OAS never was given the support to do that.

O.S. – Do you think that elites across Latin America lacked a Latin American conscience or that there was a sense that there was no domestic incentive to invest in the OAS? Or that supporting the OAS would allow strengthening nationalist elements in the opposition? Or do you think that in the early 1990's there was still a perception that this was little more than a tool for US interests? I mean, you still hear that today with the old school nationalist view that the OAS needed to be limited and Baena Soares actually said in his interview that he was so surprised that the only country that did not invite him to visit as secretary general of the OAS was actually Brazil. So he suddenly felt that he had lots of difficulties to gain access to Itamaraty. To him it was a surprise, in a sense, that being in that position, he suddenly realized that. There is an expression in Brazil which is called “vestir a camisa”²⁷ – so he really “dressed up as,” he was the “OAS man.” Actually, there is a photo that is quite famous, which shows him wearing an OAS T-shirt. And I think he embraced this so much, no longer being the representative of Brazil, and he regretted how much he thought his country was unhelpful in many of these processes.

What was your impression at the time about this phenomenon? You've written in a piece, also for Cornell, I think, a couple years back that this is a non-cooperative region, Latin America, and there is not a sufficient sense of the importance of working together in order

²⁴ Alberto Fujimori was the president of Peru from 1990 to 2000. In 1992, he dissolved Congress and concentrated power in what became known as *autogolpe* (self-coup).

²⁵ Carlos Garcia Bedoya was a Peruvian diplomat and academic. He was the Peruvian ambassador to the US from 1976 to 1979 and Foreign minister from February to November 1979.

²⁶ The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was a proposed agreement intending to the elimination or reduction of trade tariffs between all members of the Americas, except for Cuba. Its origins come from the George H.W. Bush administration's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and it was renewed by the Clinton administration at the 1994 Summit of the Americas. Negotiations, however, ended in failure as no final agreement was reached by the deadline of January 2005.

²⁷ Literally, “to wear the jersey”; figuratively, “to take up a cause.” This expression is used when somebody embraces a function or a cause with great dedication, as its representative.

to deal with policy challenges that are domestic. Is that something that is a constant? Do you think that this was an issue, that this was an impediment during your time as ambassador at the OAS?

L.E. – I don't remember the context in which I may have said that, but my reaction now is to say that many of these problems are absolutely universal, they are not regional phenomena and they don't just affect Latin America or the United States. Look at the condition of the European Union today over migration – for that matter, over terrorism: they still don't have adequate exchanges of information on terrorism and on migration. They are leaving the border countries up in the air without any kind of support, and you have conversely this nationalist reaction against it. So, when one says that there is a lack of a regional vision, well, it depends on the time that we are discussing. In the 1950's, the European leaders had a vision that they needed to unite forces in order to avoid World War III and being destroyed the way they were the last time and today they are beginning to lose that. So these things do have to be tied in to the specific historical moment. And, as I say, I think in the early 1990's, you had the illusion of progress and the ability to recreate things, but it takes time, it takes a lot of time to establish that kind of thing and to overcome previous bad judgements. And one of the problems is that the OAS has been seen more as a tool of US interests than it is. You know, the last time the OAS acted as a US tool, Brazil was right in there, in the lead.

O.S. – That's right.

L.E. – And led the troops into the Dominican Republic. So Brazilians should feel bad about that.

O.S. – That's important to remember.

L.E. – But although that experience was a bit of a mistake, the Americans simply forgot about all of this to concentrate on other matters and not worry about the OAS. When I became ambassador, the mission wasn't and probably still today is not fully integrated into the State Department.

O.S. – Is it physically in the same building?

L.E. – Yes. It was not in a separate structure, in fact when I became OAS ambassador I had the old hide away office of John Foster Dulles²⁸ – not exactly a brilliant man from a Latin American perspective, but certainly a key figure who had commanded a beautiful second office. But being in the same building did not matter. The US ambassador before me,²⁹ was a man who didn't speak Spanish, who had been a congressional aide, whose way of communicating with the secretary of State was to write him letters.

O.S. – Right [laughter].

L.E. – There was no integration into the system. The main problem is this: the Foreign Service and the American way of working things is not multilateral, it is bilateral. Because if you do things bilaterally, you can bring to bear your power against one country at a time, not subjecting yourself to a voting situation where – as one of my colleagues once described it – the situation became like a dumbbell: the United States with its weight is on one side and everybody else is over on the other side, countering the weight. If you are the United

²⁸ John Foster Dulles was the US secretary of State from 1953 to 1959.

Note from the interviewee: The brother of Allen Dulles, director of the CIA from 1952 until he was forced to resign after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion against Castro, John Foster Dulles celebrated the 1954 coup in Guatemala as a “glorious victory.”

²⁹ Richard Thomas McCormack was the US ambassador to the OAS from 1985 to 1989.

States, you don't want to be exposed to the trade unionism of the weaker states: the other side might get more weight than you have. You don't want to be caught in that situation. So if you have a policy that matters you pass it to our ambassador in Brasilia, or our ambassador in Asunción or in Buenos Aires. You don't pass it to our ambassador to the OAS. I was able to change some of that during the period that I was there, but it didn't last.

O.S. – You were speaking about that moment of illusion... When do you think that changed? After the illusion, usually comes a sad realization that...

L.E. – It's very hard to know, but in my instinct... You know, when one is working very hard – and I unfortunately spent my life working very, very, hard – one sometimes doesn't have time to see things that are right in front of one's nose. But my instinct was that the very negotiation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter³⁰ revealed the passing of the illusions. If you look at the Charter now – and some people have done very nice jobs with it, and the current OAS Secretary General Almagro³¹ is desperately trying to find ways to restrain Venezuela – has gotten some interesting interpretations and so forth. But my view of that Charter always was that it was a retreat, not an advance.

O.S. – Interesting.

L.E. – Because it took away the automatic convening of a meeting: without automaticity you had to have all kinds of situations before you could act ... It restored the primacy of sovereignty in a way, that was clear... And it also codified the primacy of the governments with regard to elections. So, in a strange way, when you get a Charter and you spell everything out, you open the door to all of the traditional fears, concerns, limitations and legalisms that people who don't want any action can work to block action. And the final break came with the 2002 coup attempt against Chavez in Venezuela. In the discussions at the OAS, Brazil again showed it had good intelligence. The Brazilian ambassador, Valter Pecly Moreira,³² said their reports suggested there was a good deal of popular turmoil and warned that this was not a good situation to invoke the Charter. That moment in Venezuela was the beginning of showing that abstractly beautiful democratic solidarity without engagement really wasn't going to work. I would be hard put to justify that. An instinct, an impression.

O.S. – Now, two questions about countries that are a bit peculiar: one is Suriname and the other one is Haiti. In both cases there was a democratic rupture while you were US ambassador to the OAS. Both countries aren't really seen by the rest of Latin America as part of Latin America, actually. I mean, Suriname is so far in the Brazilian imaginary and Haiti is distant too. They don't speak Spanish or Portuguese, you know, those countries don't really play a role there. Did you feel that, in the case of Haiti, the US policy was made easier by the fact that this was a country which most Latin Americans would not be able to locate on the map? Because it's really quite interesting that until 2004 there was no discernible policy by, basically, any Latin American country towards Haiti, except perhaps Chile.

³⁰ The Inter-American Democratic Charter was adopted in September 11, 2011, during a special session of the General Assembly of the OAS held in Lima with the objective of protecting democratic rule in the hemisphere. It also extended the notion of democracy: it should not be understood strictly as a form of government by an electoral majority, but also associated to a set of rights and values. The full text is available at: http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm.

³¹ Luis Leonardo Almagro Lemes is a Uruguayan lawyer, diplomat, and politician, currently serving as the secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS) since 2015. He was also the Uruguayan minister of Foreign Affairs from 2010 to 2015.

³² Valter Pecly Moreira was the Brazilian ambassador to the OAS from 2000 to 2004.

L.E. – With regard to that, early on, I think you’re right. What happened in Haiti, though, has been that there was an enormous effort by the United States to support [Jean-Bertrand] Aristide³³ after his election. And when that fell apart the first time with the [Joseph Raoul] Cédras³⁴ coup, I think the US policy and attitudes were very strong and they were domestically impelled also by the [Congressional] Black Caucus³⁵ and they were, in a sense, personal, in the sense that there had been a tremendous effort to support Aristide. So that all coincided with the ideology and with the idea that we were committed to democracy, so we should try to reverse that and so forth, you know, to the point that ultimately the United States actually intervened militarily a few years later.

O.S. – So Latin America didn’t play much of an important role?

L.E. – No. If there was a supporting role that I can still remember in a clear fashion, it was Canada. Of course, Canada – like the United States – has a strong Haitian colony within it, and strong commitments. The situation was very different in 2004. I was at the OAS, not in the US government, but the primary driver in all these things often is the local situation. And unfortunately Aristide was one of the very few cases in the world where a man has a second chance to be president and has learned all the wrong lessons and ends up being outmaneuvered and outorganized by civilians with no government authority or power. I mean it was a very, very sad situation and the US ultimately... Well, I felt betrayed by the US. At that point, when all of this was happening I was the acting secretary general of the OAS and I attempted not to support Aristide as Aristide, but to support a procedure that could preserve democratic forms.

O.S. – Yes.

L.E. – And, again, that would have cost resources, it would have cost some money. And as Aristide lost, within Haiti, the illusion of power that he had had, his internal opponents became emboldened and it didn’t really take that much to blow him over again. It was really very sad and it was not even the military who did it because the military had been disbanded jointly by Aristide and the US after 1994. Brazil taking control of MINUSTAH was probably very good for all concerned, and one reason it was good for the United States is that it enabled the US to wash its hands of the problem. Those are very strong words – and sure, the US continued to give money and make pronouncements. But notice: they gave no participation or troops to MINUSTAH.

O.S. – Right.

L.E. – And, in other words, they assumed no responsibility whatsoever and learned nothing for themselves. Brazil learned something: I think that probably Brazil’s military ability, to the extent that it is asked to help maintain order, has improved. They’ve got domestic action in urban areas, they probably learned a little bit from being in Haiti.

³³ Jean-Bertrand Aristide is a Haitian politician and priest, he was Haiti's first democratically elected president. His first term as president, which started in 1991, was interrupted by a military coup. In 1994, a US military intervention reestablished Aristide as president and he governed until 1996. He was elected once again in 2000 and governed from 2001 until 2004, when he fled the country due to a military coup.

³⁴ Joseph Raoul Cédras was the *de facto* ruler of Haiti after leading a military coup against Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991. He governed from 1991 to 1994.

³⁵ The Congressional Black Caucus is a non-partisan American political organization made up of the African-American members of the US Congress. It was founded in 1971 with the intent of empowering and achieving greater equity for African Americans and other minorities.

O.S. – Yes, yes, absolutely, this is recognized. Haiti, from a military learning perspective, was clearly seen as a positive experience.

I wanted to ask you about a broader issue before moving to the case of 1995. There are two competing narratives in Brazil about the role of the United States in Latin America. There is the traditional one, which has a lot of support in the public opinion, by people like Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira,³⁶ who is a historian, that basically believes the United States has an active interest in undermining Brazil's rise. According to this view – and this is very widespread – there is a lot of effort in making sure that Brazil keeps stuck with its internal problems. And you've made a lot of references to this in your writings: that there is sort of an excessive obsession with the US role, which is actually not as influential as a lot of Latin Americans believe. And then, you have younger historians such as Matias Spektor, also from FGV,³⁷ who wrote the book "Kissinger and Brazil."³⁸

L.E. – He talked to me about it, quoted me in it.

O.S. – Yeah, he is my colleague.

L.E. – Yes. You get along? I hope!

O.S. – Very much so. Actually, I spoke to him yesterday on the phone.

L.E. – Well, say hello to him.

O.S. – Wonderful. And he says that that perspective is wrong and that Kissinger actually worked actively to possibly have Brazil assuming more responsibility in the region.

L.E. – Of course.

O.S. – So some of the things could be delegated to Brazil. In fact, this is a recurrent theme among so many other elements that also show that when Brazil was strong, the bilateral relations was good. And during the key moments of the early 21st century when Brazil was beginning to articulate a more proactive role, the United States was actually quite happy with that. I personally believe this is a more adequate description. Now, what do you make of those narratives? Did you have to address those concerns constantly at the OAS? Did you feel that there was a lingering concern not only in Brazil, but perhaps in other countries, of the suspicions of the goals of the United States? Or do you think that Brazil began to understand, particularly in the case of the war between Ecuador and Peru, that the US was okay with Brazil taking the lead on these issues? Because Clinton was thinking about Rwanda and Kosovo and Somalia... I mean, getting bogged down in some negotiations in South America was perhaps not what the White House wanted, right? Do you think that Brazil began to understand that there was no US opposition towards Brazil taking the lead in those kinds of issues?

L.E. – Well, somebody once said, rather nastily, that American foreign policy has a lot of carpenters and no architects. Carpenters just work on one issue at a time, one day at a time, without any vision with no particular idea of where they are going with it. Now Kissinger actually was an architect, had a vision. He asked me to discuss the possibility of Brazil's

³⁶ Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira was a Brazilian political scientist and historian. He was an important exponent of Brazilian nationalist perspectives on international relations and an avid critic of US foreign policy.

³⁷ *Fundação Getulio Vargas* (Getulio Vargas Foundation), a private higher education institution in Brazil.

³⁸ *Kissinger e o Brasil* (Kissinger and Brazil) by Matias Spektor. Zahar, 2008. 234 pages.

assuming a broader international role, and asked me to speak to [Azeredo da] Silveira³⁹ about the possibility. Silveira's answer was a very wise one: that the United States was big enough and rich enough to survive accidents which there inevitably would be if one assumed broader responsibilities, whereas Brazil was not in a position to do at that point. Maybe it would have been better if, more recently, Brazil's leaders had realized that.

O.S. – [Laughter].

L.E. – I think, in general, the United States understands that it is better served when other countries are strong and prosperous and able to take care of their own problems. Now, in recent years, there has been a sharp conditioning element brought into all of that, because of the feeling that has grown in American politics – and it's now expressed by Trump – that even when they are strong and prosperous, these countries – foreigners – are successful because they're cheating us. So, in a sense, the United States is less comfortable with strong effective countries elsewhere than it was in the past or than it should be, in my view.

O.S. – Interesting. And how do you think this will affect Brazil, specifically?

L.E. – Now, generally speaking, you know, nobody knows anything about Brazil here and nobody knows anything about Latin America here. I have often tried to suggest to people that it is better for American policy to think of Brazil as a country in the world rather than a country in Latin America. Even though I also believe that they should be aware of Latin America as part of the world and not just Latin America. Because, implicitly, the American assumption is that Latin America doesn't matter and is too weak to make a difference.

O.S. – Yes.

L.E. – When Brazil... And I think is the only real time that Brazil has seriously crossed American strategic sense, is in the so-called nuclear deal with Iran.⁴⁰

O.S. – That's right.

L.E. – That undid, at one fell swoop, all of the positive vibrations that had started to build. I don't know, it all depends how you look at things. The difficulty is also that Brazil's neighbors aren't very pro-Brazil either, most of them. They see Brazil doing well as a new horse in town to which you can hitch your economy and your ride, so it's a good thing. But, on the other hand, there's lots of resentment at what is seen as Brazilian arrogance.

O.S. – That's right. I think that there is a notion that Brazil is excessively concerned about its global status, particularly under Lula, and not paying enough attention to the task of consolidating its capacity to provide global public goods in the region. But that was in a later period. Do you think this notion about Brazil perhaps being potentially too proactive, that was already present in the 1990's?

L.E. – No, I don't think so, not at all. As I say, the only time that Brazil came across as a strategic problem was the Iran nuclear thing.

³⁹ Antônio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira was a Brazilian diplomat. He was Foreign minister from 1974 to 1979 and Brazilian ambassador to Argentina (1969-1974), the US (1974-1979) and Portugal (1983-1985).

⁴⁰ In 2010, amid tension regarding Iran's nuclear programme and the possibility of a new round of sanctions proposed by the United States, Brazil and Turkey proposed an agreement to avert the intensification of the conflict. The agreement implied that Iran would ship its stockpile of enriched Uranium to Turkey for further processing – its goal was to reduce international suspicion towards Iran's nuclear programme. However, the agreement was rejected by the US and the other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

O.S. – Yes, I remember that was 2010.

L.E. – For everything else, you know, Brazil is perceived in the United States much as any foreign country is, which is not much. Araújo Castro once told me the following story: when he went to present his credentials to Richard Nixon⁴¹ they had five minutes. It was four minutes and Nixon was already getting restless, so Araújo said: “Who is next? Who are you seeing after me?” and Nixon said: “I don’t know” and he went to his desk and he looked: “Oh, the new ambassador of France.” One foreigner is like any another. As you know, my grandfather was president of Italy, I still have strong Italian connections and ties, and I have spent years explaining to Italian diplomats here [in the US] that Italy is no worse off than anybody else: if they are not being paid attention to, that’s because no one’s being paid attention to.

O.S. – Right and I think that is particularly difficult for Latin Americans to understand, because the US is so close and so influential.

L.E. – Yes, maybe it will be easier for your generation to understand as increased Chinese trade, and European trade, etc. develops different perceptions. Again, you see the importance of illusion. The US was seen – again, I see this so clearly from my Italian perspective – as super powerful: the US was the key force in the defeat of fascism and then the US came through with the Marshall Plan. Already at the end of the nineteenth century, also, the US was the recipient of hordes of hungry Italians, starving Italians, who were fleeing for a new world – and who were actually finding it! Although it was a difficult world, and, in those days, communications weren’t very good, so they didn’t know how hard it was, and they kept coming for years. But the illusion of American democracy, American prosperity – “money grows on trees in the United States...”

O.S. – Right, that’s very interesting. In fact, I think Chinese influence will be good, so people contextualize and look at the US influence in a more realistic way, perhaps. Now, regarding the 1995 case – again, you talked a lot about this –, one of the interpretations that I’ve briefly summarized in my book project is that this is the beginning of a more active Brazilian role. After 1995, Fernando Henrique Cardoso⁴² is becoming more proactive. Did you feel that this is actually the case or do you think this was more in Brazil’s mind? A year later, when you were still US special envoy, Brazil avoids a coup in Paraguay and it sort of begins to really embrace its role. It was only in the 1980’s that a sitting Brazilian president first visited Colombia and Peru. So in 1995, to many, Brazil is waking up, it is beginning to articulate a strategy, Cardoso is well respected in the region. Do you think that mattered to South American dynamics? And particularly to the bilateral relationship, did that, to your mind, make Brazil a useful interlocutor to Washington when potential crisis came up, or was this more something that happened in the minds of a couple Brazilian scholars on foreign policy makers? Putting it in another way, was the conflict between Ecuador and Peru really that difficult to solve? Or did the US look at that and say: “Oh, great, let’s let the Brazilians take the lead on this role and we’ll help a bit along the way”?

L.E. – The American establishment didn’t think the conflict would be solved. But one of my initial conditions before accepting to become the special envoy was that I didn’t want just a cease fire, but that we should stay at it until we got rid of the problem permanently. They said yes, and by that time in my career I knew how to make the American government work, which most of them didn’t. We stuck at it, but it took a long time, it wore out the

⁴¹ Richard Milhous Nixon was the US president from 1969 to 1974, when he resigned while facing an impeachment process.

⁴² Fernando Henrique Cardoso is a Brazilian politician and sociologist. He was president of Brazil from 1995 until January 1, 2003.

patience of many people in the US administration, but they let it continue... Brazil's role as chair of the guarantors of the 1942 Rio Protocol was critical. I may have had then a higher opinion than I do now, perhaps, of Brazilian diplomacy. I have long argued that Brazilian diplomats are pound for pound the best diplomats in the world. And I've had some smart Brazilians say to me: "You're not so right in how well you think of us." But, still... Look, if I'm representing the United States and I'm in the middle of a situation where my associates are filled with good instincts and goodwill, but know very little, I am going to be desperate to find people who know something.

O.S. – That's right.

L.E. – [Laughter] and the Brazilians always knew something, so I was working closely with Brazil and Brazilian diplomats. I was the acting deputy head of the Policy Planning staff at that point, but I was not particularly politically favoured. Politically, I had some power but I was not, it was not political as such. It was bureaucratic, it was knowledge, a different kind of thing. So I was free to devote a great deal of my time to the Peru-Ecuador problem, whereas my Brazilian counterpart, Ivan Cannabrava,⁴³ had to worry about all Brazil's foreign policy and there was no way he could spend a lot of time on Peru-Ecuador. And the same thing was true for our Argentinian and Chilean counterparts, who were vice ministers with many other responsibilities. In fact, the Chilean sometimes seemed more interested in making sure that we didn't come up with a solution that would make life harder for Chile with Bolivia. So, you know, they had different levels of interest. Behind it all, I felt that I had the support and the trust of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, whom I also liked for other reasons. So I felt that I was in good shape with Brazil – sometimes even in better shape with Brazil than with my own government. What we did in Peru and Ecuador was affecting things in Brazil itself. For example, when folks at the US National Security Council became too frustrated, too tired and too bored to want to continue the helicopter support for the military mission...

O.S. – ... Brazil bought helicopters.

L.E. – Yeah, yeah. The Blackhawks were the first time that Brazil's army managed to buy helicopters rather than the airforce. So, all of this was affecting things... [It was] fairly obvious to me that Itamaraty and the Defence people weren't talking, and they weren't in a good shape. But Peru-Ecuador forced communication among them.

O.S. – It only changed, I would say, under Nelson Jobim.⁴⁴

L.E. – Yes, Nelson Jobim is a great man! And he was very effective, he probably saved the Brazilian military – it would be my guess, restoring some sense of strategic sense and political respectability [laughter].

O.S. – He was also important to establish and institutionalize civilian control of the armed forces.

L.E. – Of course!

O.S. – After all, the Defense Ministry was only created in 1999.⁴⁵

⁴³ Ivan Oliveira Cannabrava is a Brazilian diplomat. He was chief negotiator for Brazil during the Peru-Ecuador peace talks.

⁴⁴ Nelson Azeredo Jobim is a Brazilian politician and jurist. He was Defense minister from 2007 and 2011 and the president of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) from 2004 to 2006. In 2013, professors Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho conducted an oral history interview with minister Jobim, which is available at: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/historia-oral/entrevista-tematica/nelson-jobim-iv>.

L.E. – That’s right.

O.S. – So, do you think that, in a sense, 1995 is seen as a moment in which Brazil suddenly sensed that there was an opportunity to play a more proactive role?

L.E. – Well, I think that may be true.

O.S. – But you would say that the US was still essential in overcoming the many obstacles and conflicts that 1995 produced, right?

L.E. – Oh, I think so.

O.S. – This is not part of the Brazilian narrative about this period of time. That is quite interesting. I kind of sensed that listening to the Argentines and the Peruvians, but it’s important to hear about this from you.

L.E. – You know, for example, let’s talk about illusion, another aspect of illusion. First of all, there is one area... The reason I jumped immediately in praise of Nelson Jobim is that during Peru-Ecuador he was in the Brazilian Supreme Court. He was, I believe, Chief Justice. And one of the things that we needed to do in the negotiation was to dot every “i” and cross every “t” also legally, particularly because Foreign Ministries, particularly in small countries and Latin countries, are the curators of boundary disputes and legalisms. You know, Brazil has a much more pragmatic tradition of a lot of things, and as a more powerful country, to some extent, it settled its boundaries more than a 100 years ago with the, what’s his name?

O.S. – The Baron of Rio Branco.

L.E. – Exactly. Well, so we needed to get legal opinions on certain aspects of the boundary and Nelson Jobim was “the man,” he chaired that group and rendered a vitally important legal decision. Now, there, absolutely, we could have done nothing without Brazil and Brazil’s role. Fernando Henrique’s support for a relationship with Fujimori was very important also. I sometimes felt I was the only American who got along with Fujimori.

O.S. – Personally?

L.E. – Personally.

O.S. – Okay. Interesting. We spoke a lot to Luis Felipe Lampreia,⁴⁶ who said what made dealing with Fujimori not easy was that he had a whole *mise-en-scène*. He used to sit higher than his interlocutors – perhaps not with a US interlocutor, however.

L.E. – In the ante-room of the presidential office in Lima, he had a *big* piece of melted down Nagasaki on a pedestal.

O.S. – Really?

L.E. – Yes. To keep the Americans in their place. He was a very interesting man.

O.S. – A very interesting character actually and very little understood in Latin America, by the way.

⁴⁵ In 1999, the creation of the Defense Ministry absorbed the former Ministries of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, which became Commands under the authority of the new Ministry.

⁴⁶ Luis Felipe Lampreia was the Brazilian minister of Foreign Affairs from 1995 to 2001, during the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Professors Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho have conducted an interview with Lampreia, which is available at:

<http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/historia-oral/entrevista-tematica/luiz-felipe-lampreia-ii>

L.E. – Yes, oh, yes! You know, he won the election against [Mario] Vargas Llosa.⁴⁷ [Fernando] Belaúnde⁴⁸ had told Vargas Llosa: “You must run [for president], you are the only Peruvian known in the outside world.” What Belaúnde and Vargas Llosa didn’t understand until later was ...

O.S. – These people outside don’t vote [laughter].

L.E. – Most Peruvians did not know who he was!

O.S. – Right, of course.

L.E. – And exactly at that moment people forget Fujimori is an agronomist. He was at the University of La Molina.⁴⁹ Everybody now associates him with assassinations at la Molina for which [Vladimiro] Montesinos⁵⁰ was primarily responsible.

O.S. – Yes.

L.E. – But the point is that Fujimori won in part because he ran a campaign ad that had a green plant shooting up. It was a simple ad that simply conveyed a key emotion: “Hey, I may be a ‘*chino*,’⁵¹ but I’m brown like you and I know that what you need is things to grow.”

O.S. – That’s right, that’s right.

L.E. – You know, there was no contest and he was a man who kept things going, did many things and, at the bottom, he also wanted peace, but he had a real problem. His problem was that the Peruvian elite was of the opinion – that my friend former President Belaúnde shared: Belaúnde was the one who first told me that Fujimori wasn’t born in Peru. Belaúnde said: “He was born in a tramp steamer I took when I was returning to Peru from getting my Master’s degree in Architecture in Texas. He was on that ship out of Galveston, or wherever it was, filled with Japanese and his parents came in. He was a stow-away on board of that [ship] and therefore he has never buried anyone of his own blood in our soil, he will not understand or be capable of defending Peru.” And that was a common view in the elite, a view that missed both the terrible nature of war and the gulf between them and the common people. Fujimori said to me: “I look at these dead boys” – because he went up to the border – “I had to look at the uniforms to figure out who is Peruvian and who is Ecuadorian.” Peru’s old elite sometimes did not identify with most Peruvians.

O.S. – Yes, that’s right.

L.E. – I mean, those were brothers who were killing each other. This is one of the sad things about politics and internal problems within governments: Fujimori had gone up to visit Quito and he had seen the president of Ecuador [Sixto Durán-Ballén]⁵² and told him he was withdrawing the Peruvian troops from the border because he needed them to fight

⁴⁷ Peruvian novelist, professor and politician. He was the presidential candidate for the center-right coalition Frente Democrático (FREDEMO) in 1990, but lost the election to Alberto Fujimori.

⁴⁸ Fernando Belaúnde Terry was the president of Peru from 1963 to 1968, when he was overthrown by the military coup led by Juan Velasco. In 1980, he became the first civilian president after the military rule, governing until 1985.

⁴⁹ *Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina* (UNALM) – the National Agrarian University.

⁵⁰ Vladimiro Montesinos Torres was a cashiered military officer who became the head of Peru’s intelligence service in the the Fujimori government. He gained considerable control over government and the media through bribery, blackmail and coercion.

⁵¹ The term is associated to Asian populations in Peru. Alberto Fujimori himself is also known as “*el Chino*,” even though he is of Japanese extraction.

⁵² Sixto Afonso Durán-Ballén Cordovez was the president of Peru from 1992 to 1996.

*Sendero [Luminoso]*⁵³ and, of course, when he said that, the military aides of the president of Ecuador heard that and it basically told them they had a free hand to move and do things to right what they felt were historic wrongs.

O.S. – Right.

L.E. – There were lots of things Fujimori didn't understand, he was in some senses an accident. One of the previous presidents of Ecuador, Osvaldo Hurtado,⁵⁴ became President when his predecessor was killed in a plane crash asked the then Venezuelan president, who was [Jaime] Lusinchi:⁵⁵ “Why do we have to face such hard times as president?” And Lusinchi looked at him and said: “Because that's the only chance we had to become presidents, the only time!” [laughter].

O.S. – [Laughter]

L.E. – In that sense, if it hadn't been for the violence of *Sendero* and the problems of the overly rigid Peruvian elite, Fujimori would never have been elected in Peru, but these things happen in funny ways, complicated ways. And the fact that he had neither governing experience or a party behind him made a sitting duck for the immoral and supremely ambitious Vladimiro Montesinos.

O.S. – It's interesting what you were saying that Cannabrava had to deal with other things and that becomes very obvious in the interview that the way they remember this is something they had to do on the sides... They committed several mistakes: one of the agreements was leaked accidentally to the press, there were procedural mistakes. Did you, at any point, sense that a stronger US role was needed otherwise this would not work? Because you were quite discrete throughout, right?

L.E. – Of course.

O.S. – This is why perhaps other groups are claiming credit for this. I mean, the photo of Cardoso with the presidents shaking hands, it's quite prominent in several books that I've used to teach Brazilian foreign policy. It suggests, in a sense, that Brazil solved a security challenge. Do you think that the way that this played out was good to help Brazil gain confidence and take a more proactive role? What I hear from you is that this picture is an interesting picture, but it doesn't give you the whole story... Because the US still had to play a role and make sure that...

L.E. – Yes, of course. You know, I have never tried to look at the problem this way, because, in fact, we made certain basic rules among ourselves and one of them was that we were to be the only legitimate source of public statements by our governments and we would only say [something] when we were together and had agreed on what it was: Cannabrava, the Argentine, the Chilean and myself, the four guarantor representatives.

O.S. – OK.

⁵³ The *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) is a Peruvian maoist guerilla group founded in the late 1960's. Its terrorist activity went from 1980 until 1992, when its leader, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, was captured. Since then, it has acted sporadically.

⁵⁴ Osvaldo Hurtado was vice president of Ecuador from 1979 until 1981, when he became president after the death of Jaime Roldós Aguilera.

⁵⁵ Jaime Ramón Lusinchi was the president of Venezuela from 1984 to 1989. His time in office was marked by economic crisis, rising inflation and corruption, which aggravated the crisis of the political system established in 1958.

L.E. – I’ll give you another example, then I’ll give you the generalization. The other example is that we met many times [and] I think never did the position we came out with in the end reflect the position that any one of us had come in with in the beginning and this, to me, was the purest expression of multilateral cooperation. It was respectful, it was willing to adjust positions, to allow for the positions of the others, and it was absolutely a team effort. You will remember that earlier I said: “I believe in teams.” Well, I talked about the American team that was created under Bush 1 for Latin America; then we had the team that Baena Soares had at the OAS; and then we had the team among the guarantors during Peru-Ecuador. What the United States provided to the Peru-Ecuador negotiation in addition to diplomacy was the logistical tail, the helicopter support and the myth of US power. That was absolutely critical.

O.S. – Right.

L.E. – One other thing: Brazil provided, absolutely critically, the General who commanded MOMEPE, the Military Observation Mission, Ecuador-Peru. Getting US agreement for that caused me a lot of difficulties with the Pentagon and the National Security Council, but they finally accepted it. There were other cases of key Brazilian leadership, like the role of Jobim we have already mentioned. But I would have to say that, below the presidential level, my role was more important than that of the other guarantor representatives. But not because I was the American, but because – unlike them – I was not so important to my government, I could spend more time on the negotiation, developing the elements of a solution.

O.S. – I see.

L.E. – I spent time, once I went and lived in Quito for ten days, getting the Ecuadorian Military Foreign Service to talk to each other and to trust me and then at one point I went back to the guarantors and I gave them an Ecuadorean position as my own, to avoid rejection of it just because it came from one of the parties. I had the time and patience to work to develop trust and maintain trust on all sides. And that is why I was chosen by my government for this role. When the shooting in the Cenepa broke out in January 1995 there were a lot of urgent meetings, it was taken very seriously by a lot of people in a lot of levels, but very fast it became clear this wasn’t going to be solved easily and it was going to take a lot of work. And so, key officials in the American government said: “Let Einaudi take care of it, because he likes these people and he has the patience, because he was at the OAS.”

O.S. – Right.

L.E. – So you have to understand that there are individual problems and idiosyncrasies here that have to be seen at the same time that one is building these gigantic phantasmagoric possibilities and theories. You know, I will tell you something – and you should check this again with [Osmar Vladimir] Chohfi:⁵⁶ I frankly believe that, except for Chohfi and a few others, most Brazilians – even in the diplomatic world – did not understand what was going on, how important this was to Ecuador, what its real roots were or how it could be solved.

O.S. – Yes. I would agree with that.

L.E. – And you know, changing to a different time, 2004: I was the acting secretary general of the OAS and I was worried that there was going to be a coup in Ecuador. I went to

⁵⁶ Osmar Vladimir Chohfi was the Brazilian ambassador to Ecuador from 1994 to 1999 and to the OAS from 2005 to 2008. Professors Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho have conducted an interview with Chohfi, which is available at: <http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/historia-oral/entrevista-tematica/osmar-vladimir-chohfi>

Brazil [and] the Foreign minister, your friend and mine – Celso Amorim – made me wait for two hours and then he said: “Stay out of it, don’t worry about it, we will take care of it.”

O.S. – How do you think that... What happened then?

L.E. – Of course there was a coup, but Amorim didn’t know. He was busy building a global reach [laughter].

O.S. – Ambassador, thank you very much for your time.