FGV EPGE - Seminários de Pesquisa Econômica

Os seminários da EPGE apresentam artigos acadêmicos dos pesquisadores da Escola e de outros centros brasileiros e internacionais.

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    Barriers to entry and development
    (2007) Teixeira, Arilton
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    Redes neurais e previsão de séries econômicas
    (1995) Portugal, Marcelo S.; Ferreira, Pedro Cavalcanti
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    Avaliação da produção acadêmica em economia no Brasil
    (2007) Novaes, Walter; Issler, João Victor
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    Welfare cost of inflation considering adoption decisions and interest-bearing deposits
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 2007-10) Cysne, Rubens Penha
    Attanasio et al. (JPE, 2002) have used microeconomic data on households to provide new estimates of the welfare costs of infiation using Bailey's unidimensional welfare measure as a basis for their calculations. Such a measure does not properly take into consideration lhe fact that the majority of households in their sample (58.7 percent) holds not only bank deposits and currency, but also a second type of interest-bearing assct. This work devises alternative formulas which account for the existence of bank deposits and a sccond interest-bearing asset in the economy, as well as for adoption decisions regarding alternative financiai technologies.
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    A general test for rule of thumb behavior
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 2007) Issler, João Victor; Gomes, Fábio Augusto Reis
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    Asymmetric auctions and risk aversion within independent private values
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 2007) Parreiras, Sérgio O.
    We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the risk preferences. By characterizing equilibria in tnonotone strategies we show that tournaments \:vith man~y heterogenous contestants are qualitatively distinct. First, with two (or many ex-ante identical) participants, a contestant always exerts some effort with positive probability. In contrast, with many asymmetric participants, one 1night not exert any effort at all, even if there is a positive probability that he has the highest valuation among ali. Second, in tournan1ents with t'wo (o r n1any ex-ante h01nogenous) contestants, equilibrium effort densities are decreasing. This prediction is at odds with experimental evidence that shows the empírica! density might be increasing at high effort levels. V\.lith rnany heterogeneous contestants, however. the increasing bid density is consistent with an equilibrium behavior.
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    Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 2007) Madeira, Gabriel de Abreu
    This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.
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    Barriers to entry and development
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 2007) Teixeira, Arilton
    This paper analyzes the effect of an accountability system in the Brazilian college market. For each discipline, colleges were assigned a grade that depended on the scores of their students on the ENC, an annual mandatory exam. Those grades were then disclosed to the public, giving applicants information about college quality. The system also established rewards and penalties based on the colleges’ grades. I find that the ENC had a substantial effect on different measures of college quality, such as faculty education and the proportion of full-time faculty. The detailed information from this unique dataset and the fact that the ENC started being required for different disciplines in different years allow me to control for time-specific effects, thus minimizing the bias caused by policy endogeneity. Indeed, I find strong evidence on the importance of controlling for time-specific effects: estimates of the impact of the ENC on college quality more than double when I do not take those effects into account. The ENC also affects positively the ratio between applicants and vacancies, and it decreases the faculty and the entering class sizes. The results suggest that its introduction fostered competition and favored colleges entering the market.
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    The effects of accountability on higher education
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 2007) Rezende, Marcelo
    This paper analyzes the effect of an accountability system in the Brazilian college market. For each discipline, colleges were assigned a grade that depended on the scores of their students on the ENC, an annual mandatory exam. Those grades were then disclosed to the public, giving applicants information about college quality. The system also established rewards and penalties based on the colleges’ grades. I find that the ENC had a substantial effect on different measures of college quality, such as faculty education and the proportion of full-time faculty. The detailed information from this unique dataset and the fact that the ENC started being required for different disciplines in different years allow me to control for time-specific effects, thus minimizing the bias caused by policy endogeneity. Indeed, I find strong evidence on the importance of controlling for time-specific effects: estimates of the impact of the ENC on college quality more than double when I do not take those effects into account. The ENC also affects positively the ratio between applicants and vacancies, and it decreases the faculty and the entering class sizes. The results suggest that its introduction fostered competition and favored colleges entering the market.
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    Monetary policy, default risk and the exchange rate
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 2007) Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo Soares
    In a country with high probability of default, higher interest rates may render the currency less attractive if sovereign default is costly. This paper develops that intuition in a simple model and estimates the effect of changes in interest rates on the exchange rate in Brazil using data from the dates surrounding the monetary policy committee meetings and the methodology of identification through heteroskedasticity. Indeed, we find that unexpected increases in interest rates tend to lead the Brazilian currency to depreciate. It follows that granting more independence to a central bank that focus solely on inflation is not always a free-lunch.
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    Seminários de pesquisa econômica, 1976
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia do Instituto Brasileiro de Economia da Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1976)
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    Seminários de pesquisa econômica, 1978
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia do Instituto Brasileiro de Economia da Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1978)
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    Seminários de pesquisa econômica, 1979
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV, 1979)
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    Seminários de pesquisa econômica, 1981
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia do Instituto Brasileiro de Economia da Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1981)
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    Seminários de pesquisa econômica, 1974
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia do Instituto Brasileiro de Economia da Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1974)
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    Seminários de pesquisa econômica, 1980
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia do Instituto Brasileiro de Economia da Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1980)
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    Seminários de pesquisa econômica, 1982
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia do Instituto Brasileiro de Economia da Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1982)
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    Seminários de pesquisa econômica, 1984
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia do Instituto Brasileiro de Economia da Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1984)
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    Seminários de pesquisa econômica , 1983
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1983)
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    Seminários de pesquisa econômica , 1987
    (Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1987)
    Este artigo procura dar continuidade aos trabalhos teóricos escritos nos últimos anos sobre a dinâmica do salario real num regime com reposição total ou parcial do 'pico' prévio e periodicidade fixa. o artigo descreve a evolução do salario real no regime da escala moveI que entrou em Vigor na economia brasileira com a adoção; o do Plano Cruzado. Assumindo a hipótese de endogeneidade do período entre os reajustes, mostra-se que o salario real de fato rígido, mas não imune a eventuais quedas decorrentes da verificação de taxas elevadas de inflação. Com base nisso,discutem-se os riscos potenciais do mecanismo da escala moveI em termos de aumento da taxa de inflação e analisa-se a justificativa técnica para a de cisão de expurgar certos aumentos do índice de preços que détermi na os aumentos salariais.