Governabilidade Predatória? Partidos Grandes (PMDB) em Perspectiva Comparada II


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    Majoritarian vs. Median Legislator: party trajectories in multiparty presidential systems
    (2017) Pereira, Carlos
    In multiparty presidential settings, political parties have two pathways to follow: a protagonist role, by offering competitive candidates for the chief executive, or playing the supporting median legislator game, by trying to be the pivot partner in the governing coalition. The paper provides a theoretical framework to understand different tracks political parties follow. Based on an illustrative expert survey in Latin America, we built an index of “supporting median legislative parties”. It is possible to identify a positive correlation between partisan fragmentation and the occurrence of parties holding characteristics of median legislative parties. Econometric exercises reveal that larger parties switch trajectories less frequently. Also, whereas left wing parties change paths more often and consistently offer candidates for the presidency, right wing parties prefer to follow a coalitional supporting role in congress. Finally, having played a majoritarian game in previous elections increases the chances of launching presidential candidates in subsequent elections.
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    Coalition management in multiparty presidential regimes
    (2017) Pereira, Carlos; Bertholini, Frederico
    Although still in its early stages, a growing literature examines the issue of coalition management in multiparty presidential systems. Presidents in such environments have a complex job in building and sustaining coalitions with relatively few historical guideposts. This chapter surveys this emergent scholarship, highlighting the main contributions and aspects studied so far as well as pointing out new potential avenues for investigations with special attention to coalition management in Brazil.
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    Pagando o preço de governar: custos de gerência de coalizão no presidencialismo brasileiro
    (Fundação Getulio Vargas, 2017-08-01) Bertholini, Frederico; Pereira, Carlos
    This paper examines the effects of a president's coalition management decisions on the costs of governing. An innovative Governing Costs Index (GCI) was developed, taking into consideration political and financial transfers made by the president to coalition parties. GCI is calculated employing a principal component analysis. The relationship between the variations on the management strategies and the costs were estimated using a first-differences panel. GCI was considered as the dependent variable and the coalition size, ideological heterogeneity, and cabinet proportionality among partners as the explanatory variables. Results indicate that large, ideologically heterogeneous coalitions and disproportional cabinets tend to be more expensive over time. The results also suggest that presidential decisions about how to manage coalitions influence governing costs in important ways, even when controlling exogenous constraints like party fragmentation at the Congress and presidential popularity. In addition, spending more political and financial resources with coalition allies does not necessarily lead to greater political support for the president in the Congress.
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    Too difficult to manage, too big to ignore: party choice in multiparty presidential systems
    (2015) Pereira, Carlos; Pessôa, Samuel de Abreu; Bertholini, Frederico; Medeiros, Helloana
    In consensual (proportional) highly fragmented multiparty settings, political parties have two historical choices to make or pathways to follow: i) playing a majoritarian role by offering credible candidates to the head of the executive; or ii) playing the median legislator game. Each of those choices will have important consequences not only for the party system but also for the government. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by median legislator parties on coalition management strategies of presidents in a comparative perspective. We analyze in depth the Brazilian case where the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) has basically functioned as the median legislator party in Congress by avoiding the approval of extreme policies, both on the left and on the right. Based on an expert survey in Latin America, we built an index of Pmdbismo and identified that there is a positive correlation between partisan fragmentation and median legislator parties. In addition, we investigate the effect of having a median legislator party in the governing coalition. We found that it is cheaper and less difficult for the government to manage the coalition having the median legislative party on board.