Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets

dc.contributor.affiliationFGV
dc.contributor.authorCosta, Carlos Eugênio da
dc.contributor.authorMaestri, Lucas Jóver
dc.contributor.unidadefgvEscolas::EPGEpor
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-28T13:19:03Z
dc.date.available2015-12-28T13:19:03Z
dc.date.issued2015-12
dc.description.abstractWe study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare function tries to induce allocations that maximize its objective. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of constrained efficient allocations using tax schedules. All allocations that are implementable by a tax schedule display negative marginal tax rates for almost all workers. Not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this noncompetitive environment.eng
dc.identifier.issn0104-8910
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10438/15026
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVpor
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEnsaios Econômicos;775por
dc.subjectNon-competitive labor marketspor
dc.subjectOptimal mirrleesian taxationpor
dc.subjectMirrlees’ problempor
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataEconomiapor
dc.titleOptimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor marketseng
dc.typeWorking Papereng
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