Monopolistic insurance and competitive financial markets
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2016-03-21
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Escobar, Andres Maurício Carvajal
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This dissertation studies the interaction between insurance and financial markets. Individuals who differ only in risk can save through a competitive market. They also have access to insurance contracts offered by a monopolist firm. We show that an equilibrium exists in that economy. Fundamentally, we identify an externality imposed on the insurer's decision by the endogeneity of prices in the financial market.We argue that, because of such externality and in contrast to the pure contract theory case, equilibrium may exhibit pooling. This is shown by means of a numerical example in which equilibrium does not differentiate types.