On endogenous cost of altruism

dc.contributor.affiliationFGV
dc.contributor.authorLisboa, Marcos de Barros
dc.contributor.unidadefgvEscolas::EPGEpor
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-27T11:39:26Z
dc.date.available2014-10-27T11:39:26Z
dc.date.issued1999-11-18
dc.description.abstractThe paper extends the cost of altruism model, analyzed in Lisboa (1999). There are three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, have to choose a non-observable leveI of effort, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides suflicient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows the optimal contract induces providers to care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature, which in Lisboa (1999) was stated as altruism assumption. Equilibrium is inefficient in comparison with the standard moral hazard outcome whenever high leveIs of effort is chosen precisely due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment for some signals. We show, however that an equilibrium is always constrained optimal.eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10438/12230
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVpor
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSeminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGEpor
dc.rightsTodo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveispor
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataSeguro-saúdepor
dc.titleOn endogenous cost of altruismeng
dc.typeWorking Papereng
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