Imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time-dependent pricing
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The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how policymakers’ credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine how the policymaker’s credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. Both the initial degree of price ridigity, calculated optimally, and, more notably, the changes in contract length during disinflation play an important role in the explanation of the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially evalute the costs of disinflation in a setup where credibility is exogenous, and then allow agents to update beliefs about the 'type' of monetary authority that they face. We show that, in both cases, the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation.