Valuation equilibrium with crubs

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1994-09-08
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This paper considers model worlds in which there are a continuum of individuaIs who form finite sized associations to undertake joint activities. We show that if there are a finite set of types and the commodity space contains lotteries, then the c1assicaI equilibrium results on convex economies can be reinterpreted to apply. Furthermore, in this lottery economy deterministic aIlocations (that is, degenerate lotteries) are generally not Pareto optimal, nor are they equilibria. In the interests of making the model seem more 'natural,' we show that the set of equilibria in a decentraIization in which individuaIs first gamble over vaIue transfers and then trade commodities in a deterministic competitive market economy are equivalent to those of our competi tive economy with a lottery commodity space.


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