Sovereign debt with adverse selection : a quantitative approach

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2002-10-17
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We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent services and country risk spreads such that the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher interest rates in the future. For a wide range of parameters, the only equilibrium of the model is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states, unless defaulting incurs additional costs. Due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default in order to reduce reputation loss. Although equilibria with no default imply in greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in the highly indebted and volatile countries.


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