Institutional specialization

dc.contributor.affiliationFGV
dc.contributor.authorGuimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos
dc.contributor.authorSheedy, Kevin D.
dc.contributor.unidadefgvDemais unidades::RPCApor
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-24T13:23:06Z
dc.date.available2019-07-24T13:23:06Z
dc.date.issued2019-01
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a theory of institutional specialization in which some countries uphold the rule of law while others choose extractive institutions, even though they are ex-ante identical.This is borne out of two key insights: for incumbents in each country, (i) the first steps to the rule of law are more costly; and (ii) the rule of law is more attractive when other countries have extractive institutions. The world equilibrium features a symbiotic relationship between countries with opposite institutions. Using the transition from sail to steam-powered vessels in the nineteenth century, we find empirical evidence consistent with the model.eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10438/27735
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccesseng
dc.subjectRule of laweng
dc.subjectPower sharingeng
dc.subjectInternational tradeeng
dc.subjectExtractive institutionseng
dc.subjectResource curseeng
dc.subjectDevelopmenteng
dc.subject.areaEconomiapor
dc.subject.bibliodataComércio internacionalpor
dc.subject.bibliodataEstado de direitopor
dc.subject.bibliodataFederalismopor
dc.subject.bibliodataDemocraciapor
dc.titleInstitutional specializationeng
dc.typePapereng
fgv.relation.ispartofRede de Pesquisa e Conhecimento Aplicadopor
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