O efeito da reeleição em gastos de saúde: uma análise do modelo de reputação política
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Data
2007-12-10
Autores
Orientador(res)
Mattos, Enlinson
Pereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira
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Resumo
The reputation-building model of political behavior suggests that an incumbent who wishes to keep his appointment through reelection has incentives to align his actions with voters’ preferences, in detriment of his own. Following the presumption that electors’ inclinations might be sensitive to health expenditures we test how reputationbuilding incentives may shift the expenditure pattern of Brazilian municipalities. With a sample of 3004 municipalities the empirical test indicates that mayors who try to get reelected raise health expenditures during electoral years, meanwhile last mandate’s incumbents do not. Moreover, first mandates’ mayors that do not run for reelection raise expenditures when succeeded by an incumbent of the same party.