Decision rules and information provision : monitoring vs manipulation
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2001-12-06
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We analyze the contractual design problem of a principal who delegates decision-making and information provision. The principal faces two tasks: he has to decide the level of discretion to be granted to the decision-maker and to establish who is in charge of supplying the information. We show that these two choices are intrinsically related. When the decision-maker is granted high discretion, information provision is optimally delegated to the parties directly affected by the decision. Conversely, when the decision-maker enjoys little discretion, it is more desirable to rely on a third impartial agent. The paper helps rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.