Project finance e assimetria de informação: uma análise dos efeitos sobre os spreads dos financiamentos
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Data
2016-08-02
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Sanvicente, Antonio Zoratto
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Resumo
Project Finance provides funds to finance large and capital intensive projects. It has numerous participants involved in the structuring process and a high Debt/Equity ratio. Theory suggests that sharing information among participants contributes to reduce agency costs. The complex contractual web, present in Project Finance, plays an important role in the sharing. Thus, it is responsible for delimitating the relationship among agents. This paper analyses the impact that the presence of some participants could have over the financing spreads, in a sample with 1.114 projects from 89 countries signed between 01/2001 and 03/2016. The focus of the discussion is to understand if Projects Finance with sponsors linked with the government of the local of the investment, or foreign sponsors; or even if in the presence of special lenders, like government and development banks, or multilateral agencies, features lower spreads. Another issue analyzed is the difference between Project Finance used in concession projects under build-own-operate – BOO contracts and build-operate-transfer – BOT. The results show evidences that projects under BOO contracts present lower spreads and projects without concession contracts present higher spreads than operations under BOO or BOT.