Endogenous supply of fiat money
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2006-02-02
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We address whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a self-interested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money. We obtain that when this agent can commit to a plan of action, there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues. We show, however, that such equilibrium is no longer possible when there is no commitment. This happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currency disappearonce its reputation is high enough. More generally, we prove that there is no monetary equilibrium where overissue happens only infrequently. We conclude by showing that imperfect memory can restore the positive result obtained in the presence of commitment.