Regulação e eficiência da remuneração dos administradores de companhias abertas brasileiras
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2011-11
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Ragazzo, Carlos Emmanuel Joppert
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This paper discusses the compensation paid to executives of publicly traded companies in Brazil. First, the issue is characterized as a problem arising out of the principal-agent relationship between managers and shareholders of these companies. Second, it is discussed that as a result of the complexity of the corporate structure that constitutes such relationship and of the privileged position enjoyed by the executives to influence their own compensation, it is necessary to establish barriers which impose additional costs on managers who wish to extract rents from their position. The main factor associated with the creation of these barriers is the full disclosure of the compensation paid by companies to their executives. Many issues contrary to disclosure have been raised in Brazil. These issues, however, do not seem to be sufficient to conclude against the regulatory requirement of disclosure. Finally, the paper discusses the possible consequences of disclosure on the amount and the structure of compensation and concludes that, even though there are some negative consequences, the net result of disclosure is positive.