Evidence on the relationship between incentives and exogenous risk
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2002-09-26
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Theoretical models on moral hazard provide competing predictions on the incentive-risk relationship. These predictions are derived under the assumptions of homogeneous agents and exogenous risk. However, the existing empirical evidence does not account for risk-aversion heterogeneity and risk endogeneity. This paper uses a well-built database on tenancy contracts to address these issues. Detailed information on cropping activities is used to measure the exogenous risk. Risk-aversion heterogeneity and other self-selection problems are addressed through a portfolio schedule and a subsample of farmers who simultaneously own and sharecrop different farms. This controlled exercise finds a direct relation between incentives and exogenous risk.