The optimality of the Friedman rule when some distorting taxes are exogenous
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2005-05-19
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This paper investigates the optimality of the Friedman rule in a two-sector small open economy. That policy prescription is found to be a necessary condition for Pareto efficiency. If a planner can select all conceivable distorting taxes, then, for some initial values of public debt, money balances and foreign assets, it is possible to decentralize a Pareto efficient allocation. If the planner can select only some of these tax rates, then second-best policies may also satisfy the Friedman rule. However, this last result depends on the set of tax instruments the planner can choose from.