All-pay auctions with endogenous asymmetries
| dc.contributor.affiliation | FGV | |
| dc.contributor.author | Parreiras, Sérgio O. | |
| dc.contributor.unidadefgv | Escolas::EPGE | por |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-11-25T12:53:29Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-11-25T12:53:29Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004-03-18 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We study N-bidders, asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information. First, we solve for the equilibrium of a parametric model. Each bidder’s valuation is independently drawn from an uniform [0, αi] where the parameter αi may vary across bidders. In this game, asymmetries are exogenously given. Next, a two-stage game where asymmetries are endogenously generated is studied. At the first stage, each bidder chooses the level of an observable, costly, value-enhancing action. The second stage is the bidding sub-game, whose equilibrium is simply the equilibrium of the, previously analyzed, game with exogenous asymmetries. Finally, natural applications of the all pay-auction in the context of political lobbying are considered: the effects of excluding bidders, as well as, the impact of caps on bids. | eng |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10438/12597 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV | por |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Seminários de pesquisa econômica da EPGE | por |
| dc.rights | Todo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis | por |
| dc.subject.area | Economia | por |
| dc.subject.bibliodata | Leilões | por |
| dc.title | All-pay auctions with endogenous asymmetries | eng |
| dc.type | Working Paper | eng |