Matching with quorums

dc.contributor.affiliation	FGV
dc.contributor.author	Monte, Daniel
dc.contributor.author	Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
dc.contributor.unidadefgv	Escolas::EESP	por
dc.date.accessioned	2018-10-25T18:23:55Z
dc.date.available	2018-10-25T18:23:55Z
dc.date.issued	2013
dc.description.abstract	In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore propose a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanism. © 2013.	eng
dc.identifier	https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84876446650&doi=10.1016%2fj.econlet.2013.03.007&partnerID=40&md5=e84aed9b754db0299532b68d64fc378c
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.007
dc.identifier.issn	0165-1765
dc.identifier.scopus	2-s2.0-84876446650
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10438/25403
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Economics Letters
dc.rights.accessRights	restrictedAccess	eng
dc.source	Scopus
dc.subject	Efficiency	eng
dc.subject	Matching	eng
dc.subject	Serial Dictatorship	eng
dc.subject.bibliodata	Trabalhadores - Projetos	por
dc.title	Matching with quorums	eng
dc.type	Article (Journal/Review)	eng

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