Behavioral barriers to decentralized governance: understanding participation and power in DAOs
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2025-09-22
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Cogo, Gabriel Silva
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Decentralized autonomous organizations replace hierarchical authority with blockchain-based governance, aiming for transparency, distributed ownership, and open decision-making. In practice, many face persistent challenges: low voter turnout, concentration of influence among large token holders, long-term decline in participation, and vulnerability to attacks such as vote buying and Sybil exploits. Using behavioral economics and organizational theory, this study compares DAOs with Weberian bureaucracies, focusing on cognitive limits, time and risk biases, collective action problems, and weak norm formation. The Behavioral Governance Alignment (BGA) model links organizational design features to these frictions and identifies design pathways – reputation systems, delegated voting, framing strategies, and calibrated enforcement – that can improve participation, power distribution, decision quality, and legitimacy. The analysis suggests that resilient decentralized governance often takes hybrid “cryptobureaucratic” forms that combine selective bureaucratic safeguards with blockchain-enabled transparency and distributed control.
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Decentralized autonomous organizations Behavioral economics Bounded rationality Collective action Social norms Weberian bureaucracy Cryptobureaucracy Organizações autônomas descentralizadas Economia comportamental Racionalidade limitada Ação coletiva Normas sociais Burocracia weberiana Criptoburocracia