Ensaios sobre emissões de corporate bonds (Debêntures) no mercado brasileiro
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Data
2005-07-15
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Saito, Richard
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The objective of this thesis is to analyze three non-responded or non-approached questions in the Brazilian finance literature - the rating effect, liquidity measures or proxies and security designs in different ratings issues -, which help to understand the corporate bonds interest rate. To reach this objective, this thesis is divided into three academic essays. In the rating essay, evidence was found that: i) the rating affects the spread regardless of the index used in the time of the issue; ii)the origin of the rating agency - national and international - is not relevant information for issuers; iii) the rating-spread causality is not clear in the case of issues made during favorable economic times, when it is more likely to verify differences in the risk classifications by different agencies for the same bond; iv) the market expectation on the Brazilian economic environment, the type of the economic sector and the issued volume are important variables of control in the determination of the spread. In the liquidity essay, evidence was found that: i) the issue size and certain types of issuers, as for instance oil and energy sectors, are liquidity proxies; ii) controlling certain types of issuers, bonds with high issue size are more liquid; iii) the relation between age and liquidity is not clear; iv) the difference between maximum and minimum trading prices is not an appropriate liquidity measures. In the last essay, related to security design, it was found that there are differences between covenants of different credit ratings issues; this implies that a standardized corporate bonds contract affects the issuers' interest rate, since credit rating is one of the main determinants of the issue interest rate. The standardized bonds cannot be optimum for low rating issues, since they are not allowed to include restriction covenants such as programmed renegotiation and collateral which reduce the agency cost between shareholders and bondholders.