Mecanismo LPVR - Least Present Value of Revenues como mitigador de riscos em concessões rodoviárias: uma aplicação a um caso brasileiro
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2014-09-25
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Gonçalves, Edson Daniel Lopes
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In recent years the Brazilian govcmmcnt has adopted the posture of encouraging infrastructure projects, mainly road concessions. There is debate about the best way to attract investors in tenns of retum, without, at the same time, users do not havc a high cost and can enjoy good service. This discussion goes primarily by an analysis of traffic risl<, which is entirely allocated to auction's winners today. The methodology used in recent tenders follows a requirement of maximum Internai Rate of Return (IRR), for the Grantor (ANTI), in real terms anda fixcd duration. From the estimated costs and in particular concession investments, ANTT sets a ceiling-rate being charged by the utility to users, through the IRR maximum required in tbe project. This IRR is calculated based on the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of companies in the sector, which have sbares traded on the Brazilian Excbange (BM&FBovespa), using only domestic data. This paper proposes an alternative model, based on thc Least Present Value of Revenues ( LPVR) mecanism. In this model we obserYe that traffic risk is much lower to the auction 's winners because the grant expires only when a certain levei of revenues required by the concessionaire is rcachcd. A model with tlexible term for such is necessary. Howcver, with less risl< of traffic, the upside and downside in tenns of return, are minor compareci to tbe current model. Using tbis model, the Grantor can also define a winner foa· the auctiou (the dealership tbat offcrs the lowest present valuc of rcvenues) and also uses the proposed simulatiou of traffic for setting a deadline for the grant, if demanded.