Visão econômica sobre o desmatamento na Amazônia: o papel da ilegalidade e os mecanismos públicos para a preservação da floresta
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2008-11-18
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Costa, Carlos Eugênio Ellery Lustosa da
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In this work, we study the role that the perception of law enforcement has in agents’ decisions to invade public areas and explore in a predatory way the forest within. We developed a microeconomic model of choice under uncertainties, in which farmers compare their payoff of invasion with their payoff of following the rules. The payoff of invasion is calculated from the gain/loss resulted of being caught or not in this process, weighed by the probability of each event, which is a function of the government spending in law enforcement institutions. Following this, we calculate the ideal amount of government spending in order to achieve the maximum yield in the agricultural sector, as deforestation results in more land, but also decreases the productivity of the sector. Then, we make an analysis of mechanism design and deforestation, deriving the best direct mechanism from a Nash Equilibrium in a complete information game. Finally, we describe the real mechanisms that the Brazilian government has to reduce deforestation, and propose the ways these mechanisms can be used in different regions of the Amazon.